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1 
Good Faith in Partner Expulsions: 
Application of a Contract Law Paradigm 
Jeff Schwartz 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a central tenet of partnership law that partners are 
generally free to abandon the partnership at any time.1  But may 
the partnership abandon them?  The issue of when partners may 
expel their peers has recently arisen as an important one in 
partnership law, and one that has belied steady and fair treat-
ment.  The underlying statutes that govern partnerships do not 
give partners the right to expel.2  The opportunity to take such 
action only exists if it is conferred in the partnership agreement.3  
Moreover, expulsions pursuant to these agreements are only 
proper if undertaken in good faith.4 
The interpretation of good faith has proven especially trou-
blesome.  Ousted partners have suggested that the term requires 
certain procedural and substantive safeguards.5  For instance, it 
is commonly claimed that partners were expelled in bad faith be-
cause they were not permitted to defend themselves (exemplify-
ing a procedural objection) or because there was no legitimate 
business reason to let them go (a substantive complaint).6 
                                                          
 Adjunct Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; J.D., University 
of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). 
1 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31 (1914).  Note, however, that if a partner leaves 
the partnership before the expiration of the partnership’s term or the accomplish-
ment of a specific undertaking, that person will be in breach of an agreement 
among the partners; see id. at § 31(2). 
2  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 
601(3) (1997). 
3  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601(3) 
(1997). 
4  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(d) 
(1997) (addressing the good faith obligation that is generally applicable to partner-
ship dealings). 
5  See Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 519 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
6 See id. at 519. 
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Courts have yet to settle on a satisfactory approach to con-
tentions such as these.  A workable framework, however, can be 
developed if the confines of partnership law doctrine are left be-
hind; although partner expulsions are an issue unique to this 
area of law, the notion of good faith is not.7  This article suggests 
a framework that relies on the concept of “forgone opportunity 
analysis” developed for application to questions of good faith in 
contractual performance.8  This mode of analysis first looks at 
what motivated the expelling partners’ actions (e.g., why did they 
expel this partner?), and then asks whether acting for this pur-
pose was an opportunity that the parties surrendered under the 
partnership agreement.  This latter inquiry is determined by the 
ousted partner’s expectations at the time this individual agreed 
to the expulsion provision.9  If the remaining partners are exer-
cising their discretion in a manner that falls outside the reason-
able expectations of the ousted partner, then they are acting with 
bad faith. 
The first part of this article describes the general statutory 
rules and common law principles that inform the analysis of 
partner expulsions.  Next, this article addresses the specific ap-
proaches to the issue developed in the case law and analyzes why 
each is inadequate.  Finally, a new framework is presented and 
its implications are explored. 
II.  GENERAL STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW SCHEME 
 State statutes form the basis of partnership law.  These 
statutes are, for the most part, derived from one of two model 
codes: the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) or the revised version 
of the Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).  Though RUPA departs 
from UPA in many respects, the statutes treat the topic of part-
ner expulsion similarly:  it is only permitted if the right is 
granted in the partnership agreement10 and undertaken in good 
faith.  Thus, if several parties enter into a partnership, they gen-
erally will not have the power to expel.  But if they so choose, 
they may include the right in their partnership agreement.  Un-
der the uniform acts, the exercise of the right will be respected so 
                                                          
7 The obligation to perform one’s contractual duties in good faith is well 
embedded in contract law; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
8 Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 passim (1980) (the seminal article pre-
senting this theory). 
9 Id. 
10 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601(3) 
(1997). 
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long as it is carried out in good faith and according to the terms 
of their agreement. 
Determining whether a particular expulsion complies with 
the language guiding its use is fairly straightforward.  But judg-
ing good faith has proven challenging, in part because there is no 
uniform definition of good faith or even agreement as to the 
source of the obligation. 
Traditionally, good faith has been conceptualized as a com-
ponent of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.11  The duty of loyalty is 
seen as imposing dual requirements on partners.  One serves to 
protect the business of the partnership.  The other – the duty of 
good faith – protects the partners themselves.  In order to protect 
the business of the partnership, partners are forbidden from put-
ting their own interests ahead of the partnership.12  Thus, as an 
example, they may not seize an opportunity for themselves that 
rightfully belongs to the partnership13 or take intellectual prop-
erty from the business for use in their own personal endeavors.14  
Under the duty of good faith, partners are required to treat each 
other with a degree of honesty and respect that goes beyond what 
is expected of parties interacting at arms-length.15 
More recently, courts and scholars have begun to question 
whether this latter obligation is properly viewed as part of the 
duty of loyalty.16  Partners are bound by the duty of loyalty, they 
argue, because each is an agent of the partnership.17  As such, a 
partner is given authority over partnership business.  For exam-
                                                          
11 Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1078 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(defining the duty of loyalty as “‘utmost good faith, fairness, [and] loyalty’”); see 
also Allan W. Vestal, Law Partner Expulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1083, 
1140 (1998) [hereinafter Vestal, Expulsions]. 
12 HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 278-79 (2d ed. 1990). 
13 See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928). 
14 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 582-83 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
15 Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 526 (1993) (citing EUGENE A. 
GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS, INCLUDING LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS 375 (1911) (“The duty of each partner to exercise toward the others 
the highest integrity and good faith is the very basis of their mutual rights in all 
partnership matters.”); see 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 
BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 6:146-47 (2005). 
16  See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary 
Duty and Good Faith, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 183 (1999). 
17 Id. at 189. 
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ple, any partner may bind the partnership to an agreement.18  In 
this relationship, unique potential for abuse exists:  partners 
may take advantage of this position of trust to advance their own 
interests (e.g., by getting a kickback for choosing a certain ven-
dor).  And this is what the duty of loyalty forbids. 
The duty of loyalty is unrelated to transactions between 
partners that do not involve one partner exercising control over 
the partnership business, because outside of this context, there is 
no special risk of exploitation.  Since there is nothing exceptional 
about dealings between partners inter se, they should be treated 
like normal contracting parties.  Such parties are bound by an 
obligation of good faith, which is read into every contract.  Thus, 
according to this theory, partners should be bound by good faith 
as defined in contract law, but any higher duty arising out of the 
fiduciary relationship is ill-conceived.19 
Turning to contract law precedent, however, does not offer 
much guidance on the standard for measuring whether a particu-
lar action is in good faith.20  In fact, neither partnership nor con-
tract cases have devised a consistent definition of the doctrine, 
and it has been no different in the limited context of partner ex-
pulsions. 
III.  EXPULSION CASE LAW 
Cases have applied the duty of good faith to partner expul-
sions in myriad ways.  At the most general level, however, courts 
have been fairly consistent in that they have viewed good faith 
from a fiduciary duty perspective21 (though some of these cases 
have included brief analyses of the contractual duty of good faith 
in addition to their fiduciary duty discussions).22 
The different approaches to analyzing good faith as a fiduci-
ary duty can be grouped into three categories.  Some cases set 
out a rule that good faith generally requires expulsion be justi-
                                                          
18 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §301 (1997). 
19 Dalley, supra note 16, at 189-90. 
20 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in 
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 153, 161-63 (Jack Beatson & Daniel 
Friedman eds., 1995) (discussing the different conceptualizations of the duty of 
good faith in contract law). 
21 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (partners are fiduciaries and as such have a duty of good 
faith toward one another); see also Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 649-50 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1992) (holding the same). 
22 See, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1974). 
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fied by a legitimate business purpose.23  Others follow a contrary 
reading of good faith: one that permits expulsion unless the re-
maining partners used the mechanism to wrongfully promote 
their own economic interests.24  Finally, some follow no general 
rule at all; instead they look at each expulsion on a purely case-
by-case basis.25 
None of the above perspectives present an adequate means of 
addressing good faith, and the results are likewise unsatisfying 
when courts analyze the concept as a contractual obligation. 
A.  Legitimate Business Purpose 
In certain circumstances, courts have read the duty of good 
faith to generally require that expulsion be justified by a legiti-
mate business purpose.  One case that clearly embraces this ap-
proach is Gigax v. Repka.26  In this case, the plaintiff, Robert Gi-
gax, and two other individuals were shareholders and directors of 
a close corporation involved in the sewage treatment business.27  
Each of them also served as company employees, although none 
had an employment agreement.28  Over plaintiff’s fourteen year 
tenure, he held many positions, including six years as presi-
dent.29  Eventually, however, according to his fellow sharehold-
ers, his performance began to suffer, resulting in lower profits on 
projects to which he was assigned.30  And so they let him go.31 
Gigax brought suit and alleged that, in firing him, the other 
shareholders breached their fiduciary duties.32  Though the par-
ties were technically involved in business together under the cor-
porate form, the court turned to partnership law to consider this 
aspect of the case, finding partnership analysis appropriate be-
cause of the close resemblance between partnerships and close 
                                                          
23 See, e.g., Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 650. 
24 See Holman, 522 P.2d at 523. 
25 See Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
26 Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 650; see also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (holding that courts should weigh 
the legitimate business purpose involving an expulsion); Cruz v. S. Dayton 
Urological Assoc., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 675, 679-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding the 
same). 
27 Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 646. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. at 646-47. 
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corporations.33  From partnership law, the court borrowed the fol-
lowing proposition:  “[t]he fiduciary duty [including the duty of 
good faith] which the partners owe each other requires that the 
removal of a partner be based on legitimate business reasons.”34  
The court, in applying this rule, found that the partners did not 
prove that there was a legitimate business reason to fire the 
plaintiff because the decline in profitability that arose in connec-
tion with the plaintiff’s projects was not necessarily his fault.35 
Since this case did not involve contractual provisions relat-
ing to expulsion, the court was able to consider good faith in the 
abstract.  It was not forced to think about the impact of specific 
contractual language with respect to the topic.  For instance, it 
did not address whether cause should be required despite express 
language specifying that expulsion could be legitimately under-
taken without it. 
Because the court did not look at good faith in the context of 
specific language on the topic, the rule it applied – that good faith 
requires cause – is overly simplistic.  Partnership law is unique 
in that it allows the partners to control many of the terms of 
their relationship through agreement; the statutory rules are for 
the most part merely default provisions.36  There are, however, 
some rules that cannot be contracted out of (e.g., partners can not 
agree to completely eliminate fiduciary duties).37  Which rules 
these should be is a considerable topic of debate, a debate that 
springs from a basic tension in the law of partnership.38  On the 
one hand, the law is designed to be flexible, allowing numerous 
types of business relationships in order to fit the parties’ needs.  
On the other hand, there are certain basic attributes of the part-
nership relationship that come with being a partner, and as such 
cannot be altered.  When a court simply says that a legitimate 
business purpose is required, it is ignoring this tension, failing to 
consider whether the cause requirement is something the part-
                                                          
33 Gigax, 615 N.E.2d at 648. 
34 Id. at 650. 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103 (1997) (specifying those ar-
eas where the partnership agreement may not deviate from the Act). 
37 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3). 
38 See, e.g., J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and 
Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 439, 454 (1997) (arguing that freedom of contract allows the waiver of a fi-
duciary duty).  But see Allan W. Vestal, “Assume a Rather Large Boat . . .”: The 
Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 530 
(1997) (arguing that fiduciary duties are assumptions of the common law and 
therefore cannot be waived). 
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ners can dispose of when setting up the terms of their relation-
ship. 
One commentator has undertaken a closer examination of 
the wisdom of requiring cause in partner expulsions, in the proc-
ess developing a theory that takes into account what the parties 
have agreed to with respect to the topic.39  According to this mode 
of analysis, a cause requirement should be imposed only when 
“faithful to an agreed upon purpose and consistent with the justi-
fied expectations of the partners at formation, or when the cir-
cumstances make such a requirement a tool for achieving fair-
ness.”40  Good faith would not require expulsion be justified by a 
legitimate business purpose if the partnership agreement specifi-
cally provided otherwise.41 
This analysis is a step forward in that it acknowledges that a 
proper interpretation of the duty of good faith must look to the 
partnership agreement and the partner’s expectations.  This 
framework, however, is also imperfect.  First, it gives little guid-
ance to the courts about how to determine whether cause should 
be implied when the agreement is silent.  As quoted above, in or-
der to make this judgment, the test relies specifically on “fair-
ness” – a particularly ambiguous word in the law. 
Additionally, and more importantly, to look at good faith in 
terms of whether it requires cause is only part of the necessary 
analysis.  In each case, the partner will have been expelled for 
some reason.  As explored in more detail below, the important 
question is whether this motivation was proper.42  The parties’ 
intentions as to cause are only relevant to the extent they inform 
this inquiry.  For instance, if a partnership agreement explicitly 
states that expulsion need not be “for cause,” then this supports 
an argument that expulsion for minor misconduct is appropriate.  
But the key question is whether the particular motivation for 
this expulsion was acceptable.  The parties’ expectations concern-
ing the motivation at issue are most telling; their thinking as to 
cause is one of many pieces of evidence that may shed light on 
this issue. 
The focus on causation is therefore inadequate.  The rule ex-
plored below, which defines bad faith as precluding certain finan-
cially-motivated ousters, is also unsound. 
                                                          
39 See Vestal, Expulsions, supra note 11. 
40 Vestal, Expulsions, supra note 11, at 1134. 
41 Vestal, Expulsions, supra note 11, at 1135. 
42 See infra Part IV. FORGONE OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS. 
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B.  Holman and its Progeny:  Economic Self-Gain and 
Contractual Plain Meaning 
Under economic self-gain analysis, good faith is read only to 
require that partners not use expulsion to misappropriate prop-
erty rightfully belonging to the excluded partner.  The seminal 
case is Holman v. Coie.43  Here, two brothers, William and Fran-
cis Holman, were partners of a 22-member law firm in Washing-
ton state.44  The partnership agreement to which they were par-
ties provided for expulsion.45  The applicable provision, however, 
was quite terse, permitting expulsion by majority vote of the 
firm’s executive committee, but not specifying what justifications 
would suffice.46 
Pursuant to this provision, the executive committee ejected 
the Holman brothers.47  The committee members gave no reason 
for the expulsion. They did, however, present several possible 
justifications to the court.  In sum, the other partners claimed 
that the Holmans had disrupted the collegiality of partnership 
meetings, and that Francis Holman, through his actions as state 
senator, had angered a major client.48 
The Holmans challenged the expulsion, alleging they were 
treated with bad faith because they were not provided with no-
tice, reasons for the action or an opportunity to be heard.49  In 
analyzing these arguments, the court acknowledged that as fidu-
ciaries, partners owe each other a duty of good faith, but said the 
obligation is only violated when expulsion is used to “gain [a] 
business or property advantage to the remaining partners.”50  
The Holman court found that this was not the case, and therefore 
the Holmans’ expulsion was in good faith.51 
The court, however, did not end its analysis there.  It also 
considered whether the expulsion violated the contractual duty of 
good faith.  This doctrine, according to the court, is used to help 
interpret contracts.52  Since, in the court’s eyes, it was “clear from 
reading the agreement” that expulsion without cause, notice or 
an opportunity to be heard was a distinct possibility, it found it 
                                                          
43 Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
44 Id. at 517, 519. 
45 Id. at 517. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 517-19. 
48 Id. at 517-18. 
49 Holman, 522 P.2d at 519. 
50 Id. at 523. 
51 Id. at 524. 
52 Id. at 523-24. 
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unnecessary to appeal to the obligation of good faith for guid-
ance.53  Therefore, this doctrine could not lend support to the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  The court found that the agreement unambi-
guously denied the procedural protections claimed.54 
Holman’s approaches to good faith – both its fiduciary and 
contractual analyses – have been widely adopted.55  Its fiduciary 
duty rule, which restricts good faith to economic predation, has 
been subject to two competing interpretations.  Some courts have 
interpreted Holman as forbidding expulsion if carried out simply 
in order to increase the partnership share of the remaining part-
ners.  In Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, a laterally-hired 
law firm partner repeatedly embarrassed the partnership and 
was therefore expelled.56  When the expelled partner challenged 
the expulsion on good faith grounds, the court found that, as fi-
duciaries, “partners cannot expel another partner for self-gain.”57  
The court, however, concluded that this did not occur: “[w]hile 
[this partner’s] expulsion from the firm increased all Pillsbury 
partners’ profit shares, given the large number of partners . . . 
and the fact that Heller was earning toward the lower end of the 
firm’s compensation range, the increase was insubstantial.”58  
Moreover, the court held that the evidence indicated that the 
small increase in profits-per-partner was not the true motivation; 
rather, the partners had lost faith in this individual.59  The court 
concluded that expulsion for this latter rationale was proper.60 
In a similar case, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. 
Beasley, Beasley, a partner in the law firm’s Palm Beach office, 
was expelled.61  At the time, the entire firm was struggling and 
the partnership was undertaking measures that would allow it to 
                                                          
53 Id. at 524. 
54 Id. at 521 (“In this case the express language of the partnership agree-
ment itself must be controlling; that language clearly does not contain any of the 
[procedural protection] requirements plaintiffs now seek to assert as impliedly ap-
plicable.  Where the terms of a contract, taken as a whole, are plain and unambigu-
ous, the meaning is to be deduced from the contract alone.”). 
55 See, e.g., Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 
347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
56 Id. at 339-41. 
57 Id. at 348 (quoting Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 905 S.W.2d 597, 602 
(Tex. App. 1995)). 
58 Id. at 348 (footnotes omitted). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
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remain competitive.62  Since Beasley’s branch office was unprof-
itable,63  the firm decided to close it, rendering Beasley’s em-
ployment unnecessary.64  The court found his expulsion to be a 
breach of the duty of good faith because its primary purpose was 
to increase the profits allocable to the remaining partners.65 
The view expressed above is more favorable to the expelled 
partner than the alternative interpretation of the Holman rule.  
Under the latter approach, expulsion in order to increase profits-
per-partner would be acceptable; the only restriction on using 
this mechanism is that the ousted partner must be fairly com-
pensated for his or her partnership interest when expelled.  For 
example, in Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, the firm expelled a 
partner, Gerald Lawlis, under an expulsion provision that merely 
stated that “[a] two-thirds (2/3) majority of the Senior Partners, 
at any time, may expel any partner from the partnership upon 
such terms and conditions as set by said Senior Partners.”66  The 
court, in rejecting Lawlis’s argument that his expulsion violated 
good faith, held that “expelling partners act in ‘good faith’ regard-
less of motivation if that act does not cause a wrongful withhold-
ing of money or property legally due the expelled partner at the 
time he is expelled.”67  Since the severance package in this case 
was “compassionate,” rather than “greedy,” there was no evi-
dence that Lawlis was treated wrongfully.68 
In sum, Holman’s focus on economic predation has been the 
subject of two conflicting interpretations: one finds bad faith 
when expulsion is carried out in order to increase the remaining 
partners’ profit share; the other would strike down use of this 
mechanism only if the ousted partner is not given a fair buy-out. 
To say Holman stands for the proposition that partners may 
not expel for self-gain is an oversimplification.  If the rule was in-
terpreted this way, then there would be practically no permissi-
ble rationale for its use.  In Holman, for instance, the firm’s main 
                                                          
62 Id. at 255. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 “AJ,” 
1996 WL 43877, at *6 (Fl. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft v. Beasley, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
66 Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 439-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990) (emphasis omitted). 
67 Id. at 443. 
68 Id. 
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client clearly wanted Francis Holman out.69  Expulsion to please 
this client could be interpreted as motivated by self-gain – by get-
ting rid of Holman, the partners help the firm business and indi-
rectly their own personal finances as well.  Yet, expulsion in or-
der to save the firm from losing a major client was permitted in 
Holman, and is clearly acceptable under either of the interpreta-
tions of the rule discussed above. 
No matter how Holman is construed, its rule is imperfect.  
Part of the problem is that the court employed overly simplistic 
logic in fashioning its rule.  Holman begins with the premise that 
fiduciary duties prohibit partners from taking personal advan-
tage of the partnership.70  It then recognizes that in the expulsion 
context there is no claim that the partnership is being abused – 
the ones claiming malfeasance are the ousted partners.71  But it 
presumes that this does nothing to change the focus of the in-
quiry.  Instead, when considering whether expulsion comports 
with the duty of good faith, it focuses on the same issue men-
tioned above: whether the remaining partners gained any per-
sonal advantage.72 
This reading of the fiduciary duty of loyalty fails to consider 
the full range of conduct to which this doctrine traditionally ap-
plies.  As discussed above, this obligation encompasses two com-
ponents.73  The first requires that the partners not exploit the 
partnership; the second requires that they treat each other with 
good faith.74  Each warrants independent analysis because each 
implicates unique issues.  However, the court in Holman does not 
acknowledge the distinction, and this leads to an under-inclusive 
rule. 
Holman only forbids expulsions where partners seek wrong-
ful financial gain.75  This concept is too restrictive.  There are 
many non-financial motivations that could very well constitute 
bad faith.  What if a partner is expelled out of personal spite?  Or 
because of his or her race or gender?  It seems that even the most 
restrictive definition of good faith would forbid expulsion if an 
                                                          
69 Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
70 Id. at 523. 
71 See id. 
72 Id. 
73 See supra Part II. GENERAL STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW SCHEME. 
74 See supra Part II. GENERAL STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW SCHEME. 
75 See supra Part III. B. Holman and its Progeny: Economic Self-Gain and 
Contractual Plain Meaning. 
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ousted partner could show such motivations.76  The Holman rule, 
however, would allow ejections based on these and other simi-
larly wrongful motives, and this is the central flaw in Holman’s 
analysis of good faith as a fiduciary duty. 
The Holman court’s analysis of good faith as a contractual 
imperative has also been widely followed77 and is also lacking.  
As discussed above, Holman found that expulsion without giving 
a reason and without affording any procedural protections was 
clearly permitted by a partnership agreement that made no men-
tion of these topics.78  The court believed that there was no rea-
son to look at whether good faith would require these protections, 
reading the agreement’s silence with respect to these issues as an 
unambiguous denial of such safeguards.79  Other cases looking at 
the contractual duty of good faith in similar circumstances have 
also restricted their analyses to the partnership agreement itself.  
In Heller, for example, the court found that an expulsion provi-
sion that gave little detail beyond authorizing its use unambigu-
ously denied the procedural and substantive safeguards that the 
plaintiff sought, rendering the duty of good faith irrelevant.80 
Though the framework for analyzing contract-based good 
faith adopted in Holman is in line with precedent, its application 
is superficial.  The approach is correct when it recognizes that a 
court generally looks to good faith in trying to determine the par-
ties’ obligations when the contract is incomplete or ambiguous.81  
But it is overly simplistic for courts to say that the provision at 
issue is unambiguous with respect to the procedural and sub-
stantive safeguards under consideration just because an agree-
ment is silent regarding these topics.  Failure to mention these 
issues makes the contract ambiguous, leaving the court to deter-
                                                          
76 See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and 
Corporate Law Firms, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 785, 830-31 (2003) (arguing that 
partner fiduciary duties should include nondiscrimination principles). 
77 See, e.g., Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 
347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
78 See supra Part III. B. Holman and its Progeny: Economic Self-Gain and 
Contractual Plain Meaning. 
79 See supra Part III. B. Holman and its Progeny: Economic Self-Gain and 
Contractual Plain Meaning. 
80 Heller, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347. 
81 See, e.g., Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (noting the the significance of the doctrine of good faith in contract law is 
“‘in implying terms in the agreement’”) (quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith 
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 670 (1963)). 
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mine whether – pursuant to the duty of good faith – these protec-
tions should be implied. 
Holman’s approach to both a status-based duty of good faith 
and its means of addressing allegations based on the contractual 
obligation have been widely followed.  Despite the case’s broad 
following, however, its does not appear to present an effective 
framework for addressing these issues. 
C.  Case-by-Case Analysis 
Both approaches toward the fiduciary duty of good faith dis-
cussed above analyze the problem in two steps.  First, each sets 
out a rule based on a conception of what the substance of the 
duty actually is.  Second, each looks to see whether the expelling 
partners’ actions violate its rule.  In Gigax, for example, the court 
set out the general rule that expulsions require a legitimate 
business purpose;82 then, the court held that the duty of good 
faith was violated because the plaintiff was not expelled for a 
good reason.83  In contrast, Holman set out a rule that good faith 
precludes only economic predation.84  The Holman court then 
held that the good faith requirement had been met because there 
was no evidence of such misconduct.85 
The next group of cases does not attempt to formulate a rule 
of general application and then apply it to the facts.  Instead, the 
courts simply apply the amorphous doctrine of good faith to the 
circumstances of the case and make their decisions.  One exam-
ple is Winston & Strawn v. Nosal.86  In this case, Chester Nosal 
was expelled from his position as a partner in his law firm.87  He 
claimed he was ejected for his repeated requests for partnership 
records that, if turned over, would have revealed fraud by certain 
partners.88  The remaining partners contended otherwise.  They 
argued that he “was outplaced because his interest in building a 
two-pronged tax and international trade practice was incompati-
ble with the interests and resources of the firm, and because he 
had engaged in ‘disturbing’ conduct.”89  The court found that if 
                                                          
82 Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (citing 
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989)). 
83 Id. at 650. 
84 Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
85 Id. at 524. 
86 Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
87 Id. at 240. 
88 Id. at 243. 
89 Id. at 244. 
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Nosal’s version was the more accurate, then his expulsion was in 
bad faith.90  It made no attempt to explain its ruling by anything 
more specific than the fiduciary duty of good faith. 
Another case that simply relied on the duty of good faith, 
without further definition, was Bohatch v. Butler & Binion.91  
Colette Bohatch had recently been promoted to partner in her 
law firm.92  As a partner, she began receiving reports detailing 
the number of hours each attorney billed.93  Based on her review, 
she became suspicious that the managing partner in her small 
branch office was overbilling clients.94  She reported this to the 
firm’s managing partner, who conducted an investigation.95  This 
investigation showed that Bohatch’s contentions were incorrect.96 
Shortly after this episode, Bohatch was expelled.97  She 
claimed it was for whistle-blowing;98 the firm claimed it was be-
cause her allegations had created such a schism in her office that 
it was not feasible for her to continue with the firm.99  However, 
the Bohatch court did not choose between these two rationales 
because under its view expulsion was justified even if the facts 
were read to support Bohatch’s theory that her expulsion was re-
taliatory.  The judge reasoned simply that her expulsion “for re-
porting suspected overbilling by another partner” was permissi-
ble.100 
Nosal and Bohatch illustrate the central problem with the 
case-by-case approach.  When courts simply jump from the duty 
of good faith to a holding on particular facts, the law is unpre-
dictable.  In fact, Nosal and Bohatch are completely at odds with 
each other.  In both cases, the ejected partners were whistleblow-
ers.  In Nosal, the ejected partner was attempting to gain evi-
dence of suspected misconduct before formally reporting it;101 in 
Bohatch, the ejected partner reported the suspected misconduct 
                                                          
90 Id. at 246 (noting that there is a triable issue of fact regarding Nosal’s 
expulsion). 
91 Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998). 
92 Id. at 544. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544-45. 
98 Id. at 546. 
99Id. at 546-47 (discussing court’s concern regarding the fundamental 
schism that may develop once one partner has accused another of misconduct). 
100 Id. at 547. 
101 Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
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prior to his expulsion.102  The Nosal court found that a triable is-
sue of fact existed as to whether the expulsion to prevent the ex-
posure of information would be violative,103 but in Bohatch expul-
sion as retaliation was permissible.104  Lawyers should be able to 
guide their clients as to when expulsion is allowable under the 
law.  The precedent created by applying good faith without a 
framework frustrates this task.105 
Moreover, the Bohatch result is highly questionable.  The 
duty of good faith should prevent partners from using expulsion 
to retaliate against another partner for seeking to uncover and 
address abuse within the partnership.  If courts permit expulsion 
based on retaliation, it is hard to see what the duty of good faith 
actually forbids.  To apply the doctrine in this manner seems to 
render it virtually meaningless.106 
Bohatch also runs counter to public policy.  Self-policing is 
highly prized in the legal profession – so much so that the attor-
ney professional conduct rules actually require that attorneys re-
port unethical behavior.107  Yet, Bohatch creates exactly the op-
posite incentive by permitting partners to use expulsion as 
retaliation for whistleblowing.108  Now, partners must decide 
whether to risk their jobs by reporting the conduct or to remain 
silent and risk violating the attorney conduct rules.  When faced 
                                                          
102 Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544-45. 
103 Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 246. 
104 Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547. 
105 Case-by-case analysis of good faith has attracted debate in the con-
tracts arena as well.  One commentator argued that it is from this approach that the 
doctrine garners its definition.  In an influential article regarding this topic, Profes-
sor Robert S. Summers contends that good faith “is best understood as an ‘ex-
cluder’ – it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but 
which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”  Robert S. Sum-
mers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968) (footnote omitted).  This 
analysis has spurned much controversy.  See, e.g., Michael G. Bridge, Does Anglo-
Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?, 9 CAN. BUS. L. J. 385, 
398 (1984) (arguing that Summers’s theory “seems tantamount to saying that the 
good faith duty is breached whenever a judge decides that it has been breached”). 
106  Others have also questioned the wisdom of the Bohatch decision.  See, 
e.g., Margaret Kline Kirkpatrick, Comment, Partners Dumping Partners: Business 
Before Ethics in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1767 (1999). 
107 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2002). 
108 See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 561 (Spector, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“retaliation against a partner who tries in good faith to correct or report perceived 
misconduct virtually assures that others will not take these appropriate steps in the 
future”). 
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with this choice, many lawyers will probably remain silent.  
Since the Bohatch rule makes the prospect of reporting suspected 
misconduct much more undesirable, it undermines the policy 
goal of having lawyers monitor themselves. 
As the varied results and methodologies of the above cases il-
lustrate, the law of partner expulsion is unsettled.  The statutes 
that govern much of partnership law have left this region alone, 
providing that expulsion is permissible if provided for in the 
partnership agreement and executed in good faith.109  Where 
courts differ is in how good faith is conceptualized and applied.  
Good faith, by its very nature, is a tricky phrase to define, but 
some courts have attempted to give this amorphous doctrine 
some shape in the expulsion context.  One interpretation holds 
that good faith generally requires that expulsion be justified by 
legitimate business reasons;110 another reading is nearly the op-
posite – that good faith only prevents economic predation.111  
Other cases have not been so bold.  Instead, they have simply 
deemed a particular action to either violate or comply with the 
duty of good faith without giving an explanation as to how their 
results fit into a systematic analysis of the doctrine.112 
Each of these approaches has its own flaws.  The means of 
analysis explored below addresses these shortcomings with a 
contract law framework that incorporates partnership law con-
cepts. 
IV.  FORGONE OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS 
The difficult issue that arises in partner expulsions is 
whether the ousted partner was let go in good faith.  This inquiry 
has proven so troublesome because there is no well-accepted 
framework for analyzing good faith in the partnership context.113  
Traditional partnership law provides that certain actions permis-
sible in an arms-length relationship are not appropriate when 
partners are dealing with each other;114 it just does not explain 
                                                          
109 See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 601(3) (1997). 
110 See, e.g., Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
111 See, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
112 See, e.g., Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 644 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1996); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998). 
113 See Dalley, supra note 16, at 183 (“Unfortunately, neither litigants nor 
courts show a clear understanding of how fiduciary duties and the implied cove-
nant of good faith apply to partner expulsions. Moreover, many courts are uncer-
tain about the differences between fiduciary duty and good faith.”). 
114 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997). 
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which activities these are.115 
Good faith has been explored more thoroughly in the con-
tracts arena, where “forgone opportunity analysis” has been pos-
ited as a means of analyzing whether one party’s performance 
pursuant to a contract meets this standard.116  Issues of good 
faith performance arise in connection with contracts that give                            
one party discretion.117  For instance, in a requirements contract, 
the buyer agrees to purchase all it requires of a particular prod-
uct from a certain seller.  This type of contract gives the buyer 
discretion over how much to purchase.  Contract law requires 
that this decision be made in good faith.118  In order to analyze 
whether this duty has been met, forgone opportunity analysis 
considers whether the discretion-exercising party used its discre-
tion “to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting.”119 
The approach is two-pronged.  The first prong asks what the 
discretion-exercising party’s intent was when acting.120  This is a 
subjective inquiry into why the party actually exercised discre-
tion in the manner that he or she did.121  The second prong then 
asks whether acting for this purpose was an opportunity forgone 
at the time of the contract.122  This analysis is objective, “focusing 
on the expectations of reasonable persons in the position of the 
dependent parties.”123  If a dependent party—one subject to the 
other’s use of discretion—reasonably believed that the other 
party gave up the freedom to act for a certain purpose, then act-
ing for that purpose is a forgone opportunity, and therefore bad 
faith.124 
                                                          
115See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 601(3) (1997). 
116 See, e.g., Burton, supra note 8 passim. 
117 See Burton, supra note 8, at 369. 
118 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
205 (1981). 
119 See Burton, supra note 8, at 373. 
120 Burton, supra note 8, at 391. 
121 See Burton, supra note 8, at 391. 
122 Burton, supra note 8, at 390-91. 
123 Burton, supra note 8, at 391. 
124 Notice that the inquiry focuses on expectations at the time of the 
agreement.  See Burton, supra note 8, at 391.  Arguably, expectations evolve over 
time, and it is the dependent party’s viewpoint regarding the parameters of the 
other party’s discretion when that discretion was exercised that should matter.  
This, however, would not be a conceptually sound approach.  Expectations at the 
time of the parties’ agreement are evidence regarding what the parties intended in 
their contract.  In a way, therefore, the court is looking to expectations in order to 
imply terms into the agreement.  It would not be fair to hold the discretion-
SCHWARTZ_FINAL SENT TO COPY 12/14/2005 5:06 PM 
18 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 9:1 
The requirements contract situation illustrates this test.  In 
one case, a buyer was involved in the business of manufacturing 
a certain type of fertilizer for resale.125  The buyer contracted 
with the seller to buy all it required of one of the raw materials 
that went into the finished product for a fixed price over the five 
year term of the contract.126  When fluctuations in the market 
price of the fertilizer’s raw materials rendered this business un-
profitable, the buyer temporarily gave it up.127  Then, the buyer 
simply began purchasing already-manufactured fertilizer and re-
selling it to customers.128  The buyer alleged that this conduct 
was proper because, over the period when the buyer did not pur-
chase any of the seller’s products, the buyer was still purchasing 
the business’s requirements – zero.129 
The court disagreed, finding that the contract did not allow 
discretion to be exercised in this manner.130  This result is consis-
tent with forgone opportunity analysis.  Under this approach, the 
first step is to determine the buyer’s expectations.131  Here, the 
buyer stopped purchasing when market fluctuations involving 
the seller’s product, as well as other raw materials used in the 
buyer’s manufacturing process, made the buyer’s method of doing 
business unprofitable.132  Since purchasing under the contract 
with the seller was not advantageous, the buyer found an alter-
native.133 
The next question is whether the opportunity to completely 
alter the business in order to avoid unfavorable market fluctua-
tions was given up in the contract.134  This is determined by look-
ing at the seller’s reasonable expectations.135  Here, it appears 
that the seller would expect that the buyer had given up this op-
portunity.  The seller would anticipate the buyer altering the 
                                                                                                                                      
exercising party to the recently formed expectations of the dependent party, be-
cause these expectations would not serve to interpret an agreement among the par-
ties. 
125 See Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298, 299 
(6th Cir. 1903).  Burton uses this case to demonstrate forgone opportunity analysis 
in his article on the topic.  Burton, supra note 8, at 395-96. 
126 Loudenback, 121 F. at 298-99. 
127 Id. at 299. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 301. 
130 Id. at 302-03. 
131 See Burton, supra note 8, at 391. 
132 Loudenback, 121 F. at 302. 
133 Loudenback, 121 F. at 302. 
134 See Burton, supra note 8, at 390-91. 
135 See Burton, supra note 8, at 390-91. 
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amount purchased as the needs of its business dictated in the or-
dinary course; however, the seller would not expect that the 
business would be totally abandoned if it became commercially 
disadvantageous.136  Thus, the buyer’s exercise of discretion in 
this manner would constitute bad faith. 
The same analysis can be applied in the partner expulsion 
context.  The partnership agreement can be viewed as a contract 
that grants discretion to one of the parties.  Just as a buyer in a 
requirements contract can decide how much to buy, the members 
of a partnership can decide when and how to expel.137  Like the 
buyer’s purchasing decisions, the partnership’s expulsion-related 
decisions must be made in good faith.138 
These partnership decisions have been challenged on both 
procedural and substantive grounds.  As to the former, plaintiffs 
have claimed good faith violations when they were not provided 
with protections reminiscent of due-process, such as the opportu-
nity to be heard before ouster.139  Challenges with respect to the 
latter, on the other hand, focus on the argument that the expul-
sion decision was made for an improper reason.140  Forgone op-
portunity analysis can equitably handle both challenges.  Accord-
ing to this methodology, the first step is to look at the motives in 
connection with the expulsion, and the next is to determine 
whether acting for those purposes was an opportunity forgone in 
the partnership agreement. 
A.  First Element – Subjective Intent of the Expelling Partners 
In analyzing the first element, courts should look at evidence 
relevant to determining the rationale for a particular exercise of 
discretion relating to expulsion.  In Nosal, for instance, the court 
considered much evidence bearing on whether the plaintiff was 
ousted for business reasons (as the partnership claimed) or to 
prevent him from uncovering wrongful conduct (the ousted part-
                                                          
136 Loudenback, 121 F. at 303. 
137 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914) (“Dissolution is caused . . . [b]y the 
expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a 
power conferred by the agreement between the partners . . . .”); REVISED UNIF. 
P’SHIP ACT § 601(3) (1997). 
138 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(d) (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(d) 
(1997) (“A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other part-
ners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights 
consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
139 See, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
140 See, e.g., Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
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ner’s assertion).141 
The court cited little that supported the law firm’s claim, but 
found much evidence to suggest Nosal was let go for the reasons 
he described.  In the months preceding expulsion, the other part-
ners praised Nosal’s work-product:  they informed him that his 
“contribution to the firm had exceeded projections” and awarded 
him “increased compensation.”142  All of this suggests that a fail-
ure to contribute to the value of the business was not to blame for 
his ejection.  On the other hand, the alternate theory – that his 
expulsion resulted from his repeated efforts to obtain information 
about the firm’s finances in order to uncover suspected fraud – 
looked especially compelling in light of the following:  Nosal was 
expelled immediately after threatening the partner he suspected 
of fraud with a lawsuit related to his rights to inspect firm 
books.143  That partner was “instrumental” in orchestrating No-
sal’s expulsion, and subsequent review revealed a “fraudulent 
billing scheme” that Nosal would have likely uncovered if he had 
not been denied proper access to the books.144  This type of evi-
dence is exactly what courts should look to when scrutinizing the 
reasoning behind a particular expulsion. 
Moreover, the analysis should still focus on subjective intent 
even if the ousted partner is not alleging bad faith for why he 
was expelled, but for how.  The key question here is what moti-
vated the partnership to overlook procedural protections.  For in-
stance, in VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, two members of a limited liability 
company conspired to reduce the ownership percentage of the 
third member (and thereby oust this person from control) by vot-
ing to merge the LLC into a corporation.145  In order for their 
plan to work, they had to do so without giving the remaining 
member notice of the transaction.146  The court found that in this 
situation, the failure to provide notice was bad faith.147  Under 
the applicable LLC statute and the company’s operating agree-
ment, notice was not required.148  However, the court found this 
irrelevant because in this situation, failure to give notice was for 
the improper purpose of surreptitiously depriving a co-owner of 
                                                          
141 Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
142 Id. at 244. 
143 Id. at 243-44. 
144 Id. at 245-46. 
145 VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 31, 2000). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at *4. 
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his rightful share.149  As this case illustrates, the motive for deny-
ing procedural protections is highly probative of good faith.150  
Once the motivations have been uncovered, the next question is 
whether actions so motivated were within the reasonable expec-
tations of the ousted partner. 
B.  Second Element – Reasonable Expectations of the Expelled 
Partner 
As discussed above, plaintiffs challenge expulsion based on 
substantive and procedural grounds.  When the challenge is sub-
stantive, the first element resolves the question of what the 
grounds for expulsion actually were.  Once this question is an-
swered, the inquiry becomes whether using expulsion for this 
purpose is an attempt to recapture a forgone opportunity.  This is 
the case if it appears that the expelled partner would not have 
reasonably expected the partners to oust him for the reason un-
covered above. 
Different reasons for expulsions warrant different analyses.  
If expulsion is found to be undertaken for a purpose that violates 
public policy, it should automatically be viewed as contrary to the 
ousted partner’s expectations.  But if the motivation cannot be 
characterized as such, then there are many pieces of evidence to 
which a court can turn in order to determine how to classify the 
partnership’s actions. 
1.  Expulsion in Violation of Public Policy 
Based on public policy, there are certain reasons an em-
ployee cannot be terminated.  For example, federal statutes pro-
tect an employee from firing based on race, gender or religion.151  
These laws have repeatedly been found inapplicable to partner 
expulsions, however, because the statutes literally only extend to 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Id.  A partner may allege that the failure to provide procedural safe-
guards was in itself bad faith, no matter the purpose.  This, however, is not an ar-
gument that the partnership inappropriately exercised its discretion; rather, the al-
legation is that good faith demands that there be no discretion.  Since purpose is 
not at issue, the proper way to analyze such a claim would be to focus on the sec-
ond element.  The question becomes whether the ability to forego procedures was 
itself an opportunity forgone at the time of the agreement.  The same evidence dis-
cussed infra, Part IV. B. Second Element – Reasonable Expectations of the Ex-
pelled Partner, would weigh on this inquiry. 
151 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (West 2003) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin). 
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“employees.”152  Though this may be a technically accurate un-
derstanding of these statutes, similar protection should be given 
to partners by reading these safeguards into the duty of good 
faith.153 
Basing expulsion on such grounds can be conceived of as at-
tempts to recapture forgone opportunities.  When entering a 
partnership, it is reasonable for partners to believe that they will 
not be expelled for reasons that would violate public policy.  For 
instance, partners normally do not enter into a partnership 
agreement with the expectation that they could be expelled be-
cause of their race or gender.  Since expulsion based on these 
grounds appears to be outside reasonable expectations, it is a for-
feited opportunity. 
It is arguable, however, that explicit language in the part-
nership agreement could defeat the expectation of receiving pro-
tections akin to those offered by employee-protection legislation.  
RUPA, for instance, specifically allows partners to agree on the 
scope of the duty of good faith.154  Conceivably, a partner could be 
asked to specify that the duty of good faith does not encompass 
the protections of federal or state anti-discrimination laws.  In 
the presence of such language, it would be unreasonable for a 
partner to believe expulsion could not be used for discriminatory 
purposes.  Therefore, such use would not be a forgone opportu-
nity. 
Nevertheless, this type of language should be unenforceable.  
It is a well-accepted contract law principle that agreements that 
violate public policy are void.155  An expulsion provision that 
seeks to counter anti-discrimination statutes or other employ-
ment-related laws should be ignored pursuant to this doctrine. 
Codes that prevent termination for public policy reasons are 
designed to safeguard individuals against unfair and offensive 
treatment.  Partners should be afforded this protection by view-
ing expulsion in violation of these statutes as bad faith.  This 
should be the result irrespective of the language in the parties’ 
partnership agreement. 
                                                          
152 See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that “bona fide general partners are not employees under the Anti-discrimination 
Acts”).  Note that if the partner alleging discrimination looks more like an em-
ployee than a partner, then anti-discrimination protections may apply.  See, e.g., 
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996). 
153 See Baynes, supra note 76, at 831. 
154 REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(5) (1997). 
155 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
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2.  Expulsions Based on Other Rationales 
If the expulsion comports with public policy, then the court 
must delve deeper into whether the expulsion was in line with 
the ousted partner’s reasonable expectations under the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.  Much could shed light on 
this inquiry. 
The first item to look at is the contract itself.  Its language 
can provide great insight into partner expectations.  For in-
stance, if a contract specified that expulsion had to be “for-cause,” 
a partner likely would not expect to be expelled, unless the moti-
vation for taking this action was particularly compelling. 
On the other hand, if an agreement specified the opposite – 
that no showing of good cause is required – then it appears the 
partnership gave itself a great degree of freedom in deciding 
when to expel.  Under such a provision, for instance, partners 
likely could not complain if they were expelled to increase the 
profits-per-partner of the remaining partners – despite their own 
excellent performance – because it seems this is precisely the 
flexibility the partnership sought to achieve when crafting the 
expulsion provision. 
It is rare, however, for an agreement to contain specific lan-
guage regarding cause as in the examples above; extremely con-
cise provisions are more common.  For example, an agreement 
may state simply that “a vote of two-thirds of the partnership is 
sufficient to expel a partner.”  In the face of provisions such as 
this, which are silent as to acceptable rationales for expulsion, 
courts must rely on evidence outside the agreement in order to 
determine which motivations the expelled partner would expect. 
One item to look at is whether other partners made any oral 
assurances to this person.  Take, for example, an individual who 
wishes to become a partner in a large law firm that is unwilling 
to amend its partnership agreement to satisfy a would-be mem-
ber.  In this situation, it is easy to imagine that an oral assurance 
would be made if this prospective partner expressed concern 
about an ambiguous expulsion provision.  A senior partner may, 
for instance, state that expulsion is only used in the case of se-
vere misconduct.  Such a declaration would justifiably affect the 
expectations of this partnership candidate. 
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Similarly, the past practice of the partnership may be proba-
tive of expectations.  For example, in Hogan v. Morton, the court 
looked at whether the expulsion of a law partner, Paul Hogan, for 
having an affair with an associate was legitimate.156  In examin-
ing this question, the court considered Hogan’s assertion that in 
his ten years of experience with the firm, expulsion had only been 
used for matters relating to a partner’s ability to practice law.157  
This experience very likely influenced the partner’s expectations 
about the reasons that could be used to justify his own expulsion. 
Finally, courts should consider the formal and informal 
structure of the partnership.  The paradigmatic partnership is 
one in which there are only a few partners, and each of them 
share equally in economic gains and losses, as well as manage-
ment responsibility.  In this scenario, the parties would likely 
have high expectations of one another – and these would likely 
extend to expulsion.  For instance, a partner in this type of ar-
rangement would likely expect expulsion to only be used as a 
remedy for egregious conduct – and only as a last resort.  Each 
partner likely has given up the ability to unceremoniously cut 
ties. 
However, not all partnerships are structured like this.  Large 
law firms, for instance, bear little resemblance to the prototype 
presented above: there may be hundreds of partners; manage-
ment may be the task of only a few; and profits may be allocated 
unequally among the members.  In such a case, partners would 
seem to have fewer expectations of their fellow partners.  In the 
expulsion context, therefore, it would appear that the partner-
ship would have much greater freedom when exercising its dis-
cretion; a reason for expulsion that would be unacceptable in the 
paradigmatic case may well fall within the expectations of a 
partner at a firm with a more hierarchical structure. 
The formal structure of the firm gives insight into what 
partners may expect as does the informal structure – or the 
firm’s culture.  It may be that a partnership structure deviates 
from the paradigm, but nevertheless the partners’ relationships 
with each other are closer to those of a small firm marked by 
trust and cooperation.  Here, the partners would expect a great 
deal from each other and, therefore, the ability to use expulsion 
would be circumscribed.158 
                                                          
156 Hogan v. Morton, No. 03A01-9206-CH-00214, 1993 WL 64220, at *1 
n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 10, 1993). 
157 Id. at *5-6. 
158 Much of the evidence about the informal structure of the firm may re-
late to conduct after the expulsion provision was agreed to.  This does not mean, 
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The above is a non-exclusive list of evidence bearing on 
whether expulsion in pursuit of a particular purpose was a for-
gone opportunity.  Though each of the above considerations is 
relevant, they are not equally straightforward to apply.  Ideally, 
evidence would directly show whether the expelled partner would 
have reasonably anticipated ouster for the reasons exposed.  For 
example, if a partner was expelled because he was less profitable 
than his peers, such action would clearly be bad faith in light of 
evidence that the expelled partner had been told that expulsion 
would only be used in cases of serious misconduct. 
But such evidence will probably be difficult to uncover.  It is 
more likely that a court will be forced to rely on conduct showing 
the partner’s expectations more generally, and from that the 
court will render its judgment about whether the expulsion at is-
sue was foreseeable.  For instance, when considering the scenario 
in which a partner is expelled for being less profitable, a court 
may encounter evidence that the expelling partnership has gen-
erally been marked by a high degree of trust and loyalty.  This 
information does not directly tell the court whether this partner 
should have expected expulsion for lackluster results; however, it 
does at least imply as much.  The court must seek out and care-
fully consider such evidence.  If after looking at all the relevant 
evidence, it appears that the ousted partner would reasonably 
have expected that the partnership had given up the right to ex-
pel for the purpose that it did, then the expulsion is in bad faith. 
The same type of evidence is also relevant when analyzing 
whether the partnership denied procedural protections in pursuit 
of a forgone opportunity.  Above, the focus was on the motivation 
for the expulsion itself; here, it is on the purpose for denying pro-
cedural safeguards – specifically, whether acting for such pur-
pose was outside the ousted partner’s expectations. 
Each piece of evidence discussed above is potentially rele-
vant to determining these expectations.  The contract itself, for 
example, may be quite probative.  In the VGS case, two members 
of an LLC avoided notifying the third member of a pending 
transaction so that they could use it to oust him from control of 
the company.159  Here, the terms of the LLC agreement indicated 
that this action was outside the parties’ expectations: the con-
tractual language was clearly selected to guarantee control to the 
                                                                                                                                      
however, that it has no bearing on the focus of the inquiry – the expectations of the 
ousted partner when the provision was drafted.  For instance, if a partnership is 
highly collegial, it is likely that this is what the parties envisioned at formation. 
159 VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 31, 2000). 
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ousted member.160  Thus, control was an opportunity the minor-
ity shareholders had to forego at the time they entered the busi-
ness; their attempt to appropriate such by ignoring proper proce-
dures was therefore in bad faith. 
C.  Summary 
Forgone opportunity analysis can be used to address both 
substantive and procedural challenges to expulsion.  The first 
step in each case is to determine the expelling partners’ motives.  
With respect to substantive challenges, the focus is on the moti-
vation for the decision to expel; as to procedural complaints, it is 
the partnership’s reason for denying procedural safeguards. 
The second step is to decide if acting for the purpose deter-
mined above was a forgone opportunity.  This depends on the af-
fected partner’s expectations:  if this individual would have rea-
sonably expected that acting with such motivation was a freedom 
given up when the partnership agreement was executed, then the 
partnership has acted to recapture a forgone opportunity, and in 
doing so, has breached its duty of good faith. 
Relevant evidence as to the ousted partner’s expectations can 
come from many sources, including, inter alia, the contract itself, 
the past practice of the partnership, and the firm’s structure. 
D.  Advantages of Forgone Opportunity Analysis 
Forgone opportunity analysis is a step forward from the cur-
rent state of the law.  As discussed in Part III, the law in this 
area has evolved along three trajectories.  One approach focuses 
on whether good faith requires that expulsions be “for cause.”  It 
appears some cases would always impose this requirement, 
though a narrower version of this rule has been suggested, which 
requires cause only if fair and consistent with the partners’ in-
tent.161 
Focusing on cause is not the most direct means of analyzing 
good faith.  When looking at this doctrine, the focus should be on 
determining the expelled partner’s thinking about the particular 
motivation behind his or her expulsion.  Analyzing the partners’ 
views about cause may lead to useful insights regarding this in-
quiry, but it is only one piece of evidence that bears upon it.  For-
gone opportunity analysis, by directly examining the relevant 
question, is a more comprehensive framework. 
                                                          
160 Id. 
161 See supra Part III. A. Legitimate Business Purpose. 
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Another approach has been to find the duty of good faith ap-
plicable only to situations where the expelling partners acted for 
economic self-gain.  This approach is under-inclusive in that it 
leaves much that could constitute bad faith, such as racial dis-
crimination, outside of the definition.162  The framework posed in 
this article does not suffer from this problem; it is designed to 
uncover all forms of violative conduct. 
Finally, some courts have applied the duty of good faith di-
rectly to the facts at issue, reaching their holdings without opin-
ing on the general nature of the doctrine.  This approach is lack-
ing because it does not advance the development of meaningful 
precedent on the topic.163 
It can be argued that forgone opportunity analysis suffers 
from the same flaw.  Because this framework relies on a highly 
contextual inquiry, rather than set rules, it may not lead to per-
fectly consistent case law.  The same flexibility, however, that al-
lows this approach to proficiently address the issue of good faith, 
is what may prevent it from always being predictable.  Therefore, 
it is a necessary evil.  Moreover, because forgone opportunity 
analysis provides a framework for review, the results should be 
more consistent than with the case-by-case approach, which 
leaves good faith to judicial discretion. 
The analysis presented here, therefore, improves on the cur-
rent law.  It also presents a means of analysis that treats the 
parties equitably.  The partnership has wide latitude to expel.  
Its only restraint is the affected partner’s reasonable expecta-
tions.  If the partnership is concerned about these expectations, it 
can protect itself by specifically providing for how and when ex-
pulsion may be used (within the confines of public policy).  The 
expelled partner, on the other hand, is assured that expulsion 
will only be permitted if in line with reasonable expectations.  
Thus, this framework makes sure that this individual will not be 
caught off guard. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Current partner expulsion analyses are inadequate.  A better 
approach borrows from contract law theory, namely forgone op-
portunity analysis.  This framework focuses on whether the ex-
pelling partners were acting to recapture an opportunity given 
                                                          
162 See supra Part III. B. Holman and its Progeny: Economic Self-Gain 
and Contractual Plain Meaning. 
163 See supra Part III. B. Holman and its Progeny: Economic Self-Gain 
and Contractual Plain Meaning. 
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up at the time the partnership was formed.  If this was the case, 
then they have conducted themselves in bad faith.  Considering 
ouster from this perspective provides fair treatment for both 
sides of an expulsion dispute. 
 
